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EPISTEMOGRAPHY: HOW TO KNOW WHAT STUDENTS 
KNOW, AND ARE SUPPOSED TO KNOW
Jean-Philippe Drouhard1
University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis
(URE I3DL, UMR ADEF)
We need to know what students know and what they are supposed to know. Firstly, 
because if we don't, we cannot assess what they have learnt (comparing what they 
know with what they are supposed to know, after being taught). Then, because one of 
the most commonly shared principle of didactics of mathematics (or whatever name 
is given to the scientific study of mathematics teaching and learning) is that teaching 
must  ground  on  students'  previous  knowledge.  It  is  quite  easy  to  observe  what 
happens when university teaching does not follow this principle (which is  not so 
uncommon, at least in France). 
But the point is that knowing what students are supposed to know is less easy 
to do than it appears at a first glance, particularly when they shift from secondary 
studies to university studies and when there are frequent curricular changes in the 
secondary studies. In this case, university teachers cannot rely on remembering their 
secondary  school  time;  reading  curricular  documents  is  not  very  helpful,  neither 
discussing with secondary teachers. The problem is the lack of a common language, 
or  better  said,  that  the  common  language  is  not  accurate  enough.  Saying  that 
“students know derivatives of the standard functions” is far too fuzzy and superficial: 
do they ‘know how’, or ‘know why’? Are they able to use derivatives to draw the 
graph of a function, or to draw graphs to understand the derivatives? And what are 
the ‘standard’ functions? To what extent are they able to calculate the derivative of a 
‘compound’ function? Etc.
We propose to address this problem (how to know students’ knowledge) in an 
entirely  new  approach  called  “epistemography”  which  is,  roughly,  an  attempt  to 
describe the structure of this knowledge.
Epistemography  is  based  on  an  attempt  to  generalise  and  conceptualise 
findings  about  knowledge  we  made  during  previous  researches.  These  research 
studies belong to two quite different domains of mathematics education: Algebraic 
Thinking and Mathematical Discussion. According with many authors we found that 
symbolic and linguistic knowledge plays a central role in Algebraic Thinking. And 
we faced the following question: to what extent is this knowledge,  mathematical? 
1 Jean-Philippe.Drouhard@unice.fr
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Letters and symbols are not mathematical objects in the same way that numbers or 
sets  or  functions  are2;  but  on  the  other  hand  they  are  equally  necessary  to  do 
mathematics.  Mathematical  Discussion  Situations  (see  Bartolini  Bussi,  1991,  or 
Hoyles,  1985)  too  involve  knowledge  that  is  not  strictly  mathematical:  logical 
knowledge, knowledge on how to participate in a mathematical discussion, and more 
generally knowledge on how to do mathematics (what is a proof, what requirements 
must meet a statement to be accepted, what is the role of a counterexample etc.). 
Roughly, this kind of knowledge is on statements on mathematical objets rather than 
just on mathematical objects.
Epistemography is a description of the structure of what the subjects have to 
know  in  order  to  actually  do  mathematics  (and  not  just  to  pretend  to  do 
mathematics!).  We chose to call  this  theory “epistemography” because it  is  about 
knowledge (“epistemo-”) but,  unlike epistemology, not in a historical  perspective: 
rather, epistemography is a kind of geography of knowledge.
There are (at least) four wide theoretical perspectives on knowledge: objects-
centred,  representations-centred,  actions-centred  and  rules-centred.  Many attempts 
were  made  to  relate  two  or  sometimes  three  of  these  perspectives  (e.  g.  L.  S. 
Vygotsky,  1986,  L.  Wittgenstein,1986,  2001,  Sfard,  1991,  or  Vergnaud,  1996). 
Epistemography  aims  to  unify  the  four  perspectives  in  a  unique  framework  – 
fortunately limited to what the subjects have to know in order to do mathematics: 
epistemography does not pretend to be the new Theory of Everything! 
We  claim  that  what  is  to  be  known  is  made  of  five  tightly  interrelated 
organised  systems:  the  mathematical  universe,  the  system  of  semio-linguistic 
representations,  the  instruments,  the  rules  of  the  mathematical  game,  and  the 
identifiers. We will now present in detail these five knowledge systems.
THE MATHEMATICAL UNIVERSE
To solve  some geometrical  problems  on parallelism,  you must  know that  if  two 
straight lines are parallel to a third straight line, then they are parallel to each other - 
even if you think that there is nothing like a straight line in the real world. You can 
believe that mathematical entities are real objects, or just virtual ones; that they exist 
somewhere or that they can be reduced to the set of their relations and properties 
(Otte, 2006). Whatever philosophical option you take, if you want to do mathematics, 
you need to have some knowledge about something. We call a “mathematical object” 
2 More  precisely,  digits,  letters,  symbols  and  expressions  made  with  them  form  a  “language”.  Languages  are 
mathematically described by the “Language Theory”, which is a part of Mathematical Logic (a branch of Model 
theories, shared with computer science). Mathematical language is a part of mathematics in as much as logic can be 
considered as a part of mathematics; difficult point.
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this  “something”,  and  the  Mathematical  Universe  the  system  made  up  of  these 
mathematical objects (e.g. rectangles), their relations (e. g. squares are rectangles) 
and properties (e. g. the two diagonals of a rectangle have the same length). Usually, 
objects  of  the  mathematical  universe  may  be  described  as  individuals  (like  the 
number e) or classes (the commutative groups).
It  is  easy  to  find  examples  of  mathematical  objects  (like  functions  or 
morphisms) and properties, but almost impossible to find a universal characterisation 
that  encompasses  all  kind  of  mathematics  from  kindergarten  to  university.  For 
instance,  one  could  characterise  mathematical  properties  as  those  which  can  be 
expressed  by   first-order  logic  statements.  This  will  fit  well  for  advanced 
mathematics properties like linearity of derivative operators, but it is poorly relevant 
for cubic and cylindric woodblocks properties (the latter rolls better than the first) 
“taught”  in  kindergarten  and  early  school  levels.  Nevertheless,  at  a  given 
mathematical level, it is always possible to identify the corresponding objects and 
properties to be learnt. 
SEMIO-LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATIONS SYSTEM
How  to  avoid,  however,  considering  as  belonging  to  the  mathematical  universe, 
objets or properties whose nature is totally different?  We must, actually, distinguish 
carefully (mathematical) objects (like the number 20) from their (semiolinguistic3) 
representations (like the string of characters “20” made of a  “2” and a “0”, but also 
“XX” made of two “X” or “::::: :::::” made of twenty dots). This distinction –and its 
consequences–  is  essential  and  has  been  stressed  by  many  authors  (Drouhard  & 
Teppo, 2004, Duval, 1995, 2000, 2006, Ernest, 2006, Kirshner, 1989, Radford, 2006, 
Bagni, 2007 amongst many others), following the founders of semiotics (C. S. Peirce, 
U.  Eco),  logic  (G.  Frege)  and  linguistics  (F.  de  Saussure).  Misunderstanding  or 
neglecting this distinction may lead to quite severe consequences on mathematics 
learning and teaching  studies.  Hence  our  claim is  that,  besides  knowledge  about 
objects  of  mathematical  universe,  students  must  have  some  (at  least  practical) 
knowledge  of  the  very  complex and heterogeneous,  and often  hidden,  system of 
semio-linguistic representations.
But,  how  van  we  decide  if  a  given  property  is  mathematical  or  semio-
linguistic?  There  is  a  practical  criterion:  mathematic  properties  may  be  called 
“representation-free”: they remain true whatever representation system is used. For 
example, the proof of irrationality of √2 does not depend on how integers, square 
roots or fractions are written. Actually the Greeks’ notations of the first proof had 
nothing in common with ours (in particular they did not use any symbolic writing). 
3 “semio-” means “related to signs” and “linguistic”, “related to language”; see further.
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Semiotic  properties,  on  the  contrary,  rely  on  representational  conventions.  The 
property that in order to write 1/3 you need an infinite number of decimals is true – in 
base ten only; it is false in base three (“0,1”: zero unit and one third) or, as in the 
Babylonian system, in base sixty (“ ”: zero unit and twenty sixtieths).
Mathematical language
What  are  the  characteristics  of  the  semio-linguistic  system?  First  of  all,  the 
“mathematical language” (in a loose sense) is a written one4. Mathematical semio-
linguistic  units are written texts. Following and extending Laborde’s ideas (1990), 
written mathematical texts are heterogeneous, made of natural language sentences, 
symbolic writings, diagrams and tables, graphs and illustrations. Their organisation 
follows what we call the fruit cake analogy, the natural language being the dough and 
the symbolic writings, diagrams, graphs and illustrations being the fruit pieces. To 
describe rigorously such a complex structure is far from easy. 
Linguistic system
Students’ ability to understand natural language mathematical texts (the “dough”) is 
linguistic by nature. Mathematical natural language (we call it the “mathematicians 
jargon”) is mostly the natural language itself; but Laborde (1982) showed there are 
some  differences  (unusual  syntactic  constructions  like  “Let  x be  a  number...”) 
between the jargon and the mother-tongue, difficult to interpret by students.
Symbolic  writings (like “b2 - 4ac > 0”) make up a language,  too (Brown & 
Drouhard, 2004, Drouhard et al, 2006), which is far more complex and different from 
mother-tongue than it appears at first sight; detailed and accurate descriptions of this 
language can be found in Kirshner (1987) and Drouhard (1992). Students must learn 
this language and its syntax5 – which allows symbolic manipulation (Bell, 1996): the 
actual mathematic language, ruled by a rigid syntax, permits to perform operations on 
the symbolic expressions rather than on (mental or graphic) representations.
The present  mathematical  language is  also  characterised  by a  complex but 
precise  semantics.  Semantics  (the science of the meaning) is  the set  of rules  and 
procedures  which  allows  interpreting  expressions,  in  other  words  which  allows 
relating expressions to mathematical objects.
The most accurate description of this semantics (how symbolic writings refer 
to  mathematical  objects  and  properties)  is  based  on  G.  Frege’s  ideas  (Drouhard, 
1995).  G.  Frege’s  key  concepts  are  “Bedeutung”  (“denotation”,  which  can  be  a 
4 which puts upside down the usual relationship between oral speech and written texts
5 the syntax is the part of the grammar which deals with the rules that relate one to another the elements of a language. 
(Syntax says that a parenthesis must be close once opened...
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numerical value (in the case of “e”), a numerical function (in the case of “a+b”), a 
truth value (in the case of “1 > (     )0” or a boolean function “x+1 <  (   10” , according to 
    (   the typeof symbolic writing , and “Sinn  )?   “sense”, theway denotation is given). The 
linguistic  nature  of  students’  difficulties  with  symbolic  writings  is  often 
underestimated, or confused with conceptual difficulties. 
Semiotic system
Let’s give an example of a semiotic problem. How to represent an infinite set  in 
extension? In the case of a geometrical set of a limited size (say, the points of the 
sizes of a given triangle), the infinite set of points is conventionally represented by 
the three lines. This is a semiotic convention: one assumes that the limited painted 
surface on the paper (or the finite set of pixels on the screen) represents the whole 
infinite set of points. But the problem is tougher if the (infinite) set is not limited in 
size: how to represent, for example, the graph of a cubic function? The answer is, by 
choosing  an  adequate  window  where  “things  happen”;  obviously  the  window 
90 < x < 110,  999,990 < x < 1,000,010 is not a good representation of the graph of 
the  cubic  funcion  y = x3.  I  said  “obviously”  because  it  is  obvious  for  us 
mathematicians  (or  more precisely  it  became obvious;  but  students  have a  lot  of 
trouble learning this kind of semiotic conventions (above all when using computers, 
or graphing calculators). 
Diagrams and tables, graphs and illustrations are not elements of a language, 
therefore  they  cannot  be  described  by  linguistics;  but  they  can  be  described  by 
semiotics, the science of signs. 
There are more than one approach to mathematics semiotics, which were fully 
presented in the special issue N° 134 (2003) of Educational Studies in Mathematics. 
Duval dedicated his lifelong work to an extensive and coherent theory of semiotics of 
mathematics  education  (19).  Three  key  concepts  are  the  semiotic  representation 
registers,  the treatments (within a register) and the conversions (between different 
registers). Other researchers (see amongst others Otte, 2006) are investigating how to 
interpret mathematics education using the terms of the founder of semiotics, Charles 
S. Peirce. Peirce’s main concepts (applied to mathematics education) are the three 
types of signs (index,  icon,  symbol) and the three types of inferences (induction, 
abduction, deduction). 
An entire communication paper would not suffice to present even a small part 
of the outcomes of semiotics for mathematics education. Moreover, semiotics doesn’t 
limit itself to describing just non-linguistic representations such as graphs.  It  also 
describes linguistic elements, in as much as they are signs (Eco, 1975). The same 
problem of representing an infinite set in extension occurs with the infinite series of 
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decimals. Imagine I ask you what the properties of the number 0,666... are. When 
multiplied by 3 it gives 2? No. Actually I had in mind the number 22241/3333. And 
yes, I cheated: I broke the representational rule of decimals, which is a semiotic rule 
(on  how  to  interpret  elements  like  “...”)  about  linguistic  objects  (the  numeric 
expressions).
That  is  why  we  called  “semio-linguistic”  (and  not,  following  Duval,  just 
“semiotic”) the mathematics representation system. 
Therefore students must handle both aspects of this representation system, the 
linguistic as well as the semiotic one, and the complex interaction between them.
Instruments
Up to now we have seen that to do mathematics, students must not only know objects 
and how to represent them: now we will see that they need also to know how to use 
instruments (Rabardel & Vérillon, 1995) to operate on the representations of objects. 
However,  unlike  object/representation  opposition,  instruments  are  not 
characterised by their nature (mathematical objects can also be tools,  as noted by 
Douady,  1986)  but  instead  by  their  use.  Students,  then,  must  learn  what  these 
instruments are and how to use them. Given that instruments are only characterised 
by their  use,  it  is  possible  to propose a typology, based on their  nature:  material 
instruments  (like  rulers  or  compasses,  see  Bagni,  2007),  conceptual  instruments 
(mathematical  properties,  like  theorems),  semiotic  instruments  (manipulations  on 
semiotic representations) – this idea appears in L. S. Vygotsky); eventually one may 
consider “meta” instruments like strategies and, more generally, meta-rules.
The rules of the mathematical game
We have  seen  that  students  must  know what  mathematical  objects  are  and  their 
properties, how to represent them and how to use instruments. Is this sufficient to do 
mathematics?  Not  at  all:  using  a  given  instrument  to  operate  on  a  given 
representation may be, or not, legitimate (even if done properly). For instance, using 
a ruler to prove that two segments have the same length is not legitimate in a formal 
demonstration.  That  is  what  we  call  a  rule  of  the  mathematical  game.  Another 
example  is:  can  we  say  that  we  proved a  statement  just  by  giving  an  example? 
Therefore mathematics is not just a question of objects, representations and tools, but 
also of rules,  which are saying what  the actions are  that  we  may or  may not do 
amongst the actions we  can do. Mathematics is not a game in the same sense that 
chess is a game, but, like chess, mathematics does have rules. These rules, moreover, 
are  changing  with  passing  times:  the  present  norms  of  rigour  (which  are  rules) 
prevent us to prove some theorems in the same way as Euler did (using divergent 
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series  for instance).  L.  Wittgenstein (the “second Wittgenstein”,  the author of the 
Philosophical  Remarks,  or  On  Certainty)  is  an  invaluable  guide  to  clarify  the 
extremely complex relationship between objects, signs, practices and rules. (Ernest, 
1994, Bagni, 2006b)
SUBPARADIGMS
Some rules (in particular logic) are universal for all mathematics. But other rules are 
related to  a  certain domain of  mathematics.  A square number is  always  positive, 
except when studying complex numbers. Or, measuring with a ruler is a legitimate 
way  to  assess  a  geometrical  statement  in  the  primary  school,  and  it  becomes 
illegitimate  in  a  more  hypothetical-deductive-like  geometry.  We  claim  that 
mathematics  is  divided  in  such  subparadigms  (which  are  analogous  Kuhn’s 
paradigms, but less vast, and commensurable between them. The students’ problem is 
that  they pass  from a subparadigm to another but without any warning about the 
change of the rules of the game.
This notion of subparadigm allows us to understand the shift  from a rather 
“empirical” calculus at the secondary level (based on re    ference functions and their 
(        )      properties to a deductive calculus at the university with an extensive useof ε and 
η(.      )      Instruments change, thus Objects the functions, their definitions and their 
(  .     properties alsochange The reasoningsarenot really the same any more, because the 
principles of the game acutely changed (both at the level of the epistemic status of the 
parts of the reasoning and at the level of the kind of the demonstrative discourse). 
The semiotic systems, although looking the same, are different in fact (as far as the 
systems of symbolic writings have to allow now deductive discourse); at the same 
time, the graphs come to have a status of illustrative sketches.
IDENTIFYING KNOWLEDGE
A last  type  of  knowledge  allows  us  to  identify  (or  recognise)  if  what  we  do  is 
mathematical or not, and to identify to what domain of mathematics it belongs. When 
a student writes something that superficially looks like mathematics but actually is 
wrong or meaningless, the teacher might say: “This is not mathematics”; and if later 
the  student  succeeds  in  writing  a  meaningful  and  correct  mathematical  text,  the 
teacher might comment: “This is  mathematics”. With these statements, the teacher 
speaks about the student’s text but also about mathematics; he is actually teaching the 
student  what is mathematics – and what is not6 (Sackur et al., 2005). We call this 
Identifying  Knowledge;  it  is  also  that  which  allows  us  to  recognise  whether  a 
6 which would be almost impossible to do with an explicit discourse within this context: definition or characterization 
of mathematics are epistemological statements, not mathematical statements
19/04/08 7/10
Epistemography ICME11 TSC17 Drouhard_en
mathematical  problem  is  analytical,  geometrical  or  algebraic,  and  to  choose  the 
appropriate instruments to solve it (without certainty: this kind of knowledge is more 
abductive that deductive, see Panizza, 2005).
ONGOING EMPIRICAL STUDY
 We just  begin  at  present  to  use  this  model  for  an  empirical  study of  first  year 
university students’ knowledge in algebra and calculus, in France7 and in Argentina8. 
The aim of this study is to point out in a precise way the discrepancies,  between 
secondary and university mathematics, and possibly within the first year mathematics 
units,  in  order  to  better  understand  the  phenomenon of  massive  students’  failure 
during the first years of the university in France and in Argentina.
CONCLUSION
A way to cope with the problem of identifying students’ mathematical knowledge has 
long been to focus on students’ solving abilities and this can explain the prominent 
role  which  has  been  given  to  assessment  throughout  the  world.  However,  many 
mathematicians  remain reluctant to reduce assessment  criteria  to  solving abilities. 
Our point is that solving abilities are not so relevant clues on what students know and 
what they are supposed to know. On the one hand, the student’s failure in achieving a 
task  does  not  give  much  information  on  what  his  or  her  deficiencies  or 
misconceptions are. On the other hand, the student’s success may just show his or her 
technical abilities, but we cannot be sure that s/he understood conceptually.
Then, how can we determine what students know and are supposed to know? We 
claim that epistemography can provide accurate answers to this question. 
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